Security review (v1.0)¶
The v1.0 security review (roadmap §9): what Lagrange trusts, how the viewer protocol is
protected, what is fuzzed, and the state of the dependencies. Written on 2026-10-29 for v1.0.0.
Reporting a vulnerability: SECURITY.md.
1. What is trusted¶
Input |
Trust |
Protection |
|---|---|---|
Viewer protocol from a client |
Untrusted when reachable over TCP |
Unix sockets are created mode 0600 before |
Viewer protocol from a server, in the viewer |
Untrusted (a viewer may connect to any server) |
The same frame limits and checks; TLS verifies the server’s certificate and host name or address ( |
Robot and world files (URDF, SDFormat, MJCF, USD), profiles, recordings, OpenStreetMap, elevation rasters, 3D Tiles |
Trusted as code-adjacent content: like the files a user opens in an editor |
Parsed by OpenUSD, Assimp, tinyxml2, jsoncons, GDAL and the MCAP reader at load or build time, never during a step. Do not open files from someone you do not trust in a run that has access to secrets |
Plugins ( |
Code execution by design |
Load only plugins and FMUs you would run as programs. The ABI checks the major version; it cannot sandbox. Only the person starting the server loads plugins (RFC 0008 §1): |
ROS 2 topics and services |
As ROS 2 itself: the DDS domain is the boundary |
Use SROS2 and a private |
2. The viewer protocol over a network¶
# A certificate and key (PEM), e.g. from your CA or, for a test, self-signed:
openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 -nodes -days 365 \
-subj /CN=sim-host -addext subjectAltName=DNS:sim-host -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem
head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 > token.txt; chmod 600 token.txt
lagrange_server --listen tls://0.0.0.0:47610 --tls-cert cert.pem --tls-key key.pem \
--auth-token-file token.txt
# On the other machine:
lagrange_viewer --connect tls://sim-host:47610 --tls-ca cert.pem --auth-token-file token.txt
tcp://on loopback needs nothing;tcp://ortls://beyond loopback needs--auth-token-file. Send a token overtls://only: overtcp://it travels in clear text.The viewer also reads
LAGRANGE_TLS_CAandLAGRANGE_AUTH_TOKEN.Shared memory (the
memfdfast path) is offered on Unix sockets only.
Checked by Tls.* (proto/transport/test/test_transport.cpp: frames both ways over TLS, a
server with an untrusted certificate refused, tls:// without a client context refused) and
Security.TlsWithATokenGreetsOnlyClientsThatHaveIt (server/test/test_server.cpp). The limits
before the handshake are checked by ConnectionLimitsTest.* and ConnectionFloodTest.*
(server/test/test_connection_limits.cpp), which include QA finding #7 of
docs/plan/qa-2026-11-12.md as a test: 8 clients announcing 60 MiB frames without a
ClientHello are refused at their header with the server’s memory flat, and 3000 connections
in a loop, on a Unix socket and on TCP with a token, leave at most 16 waiting while a viewer
still gets in.
3. Fuzzing¶
Decoder |
Harness |
Run in every build |
libFuzzer (Clang, |
|---|---|---|---|
Frame reader (length prefix, limits; a second mode, chosen by the top bit of the first byte, starts at a small limit and raises it after the first frame as the server does after the |
|
|
|
Scene snapshots and deltas |
|
|
|
The libFuzzer targets have not been run for a long campaign on this machine (GitHub Actions,
where a nightly job would run them, are disabled); TODO(verify): a nightly run of each for an
hour under ASan once CI is back. Not fuzzed: the USD, URDF, MJCF and OpenStreetMap readers
(trusted content, §1), and the server’s command handling beyond the frame and the protobuf
parser.
4. Dependencies¶
Every dependency, its version, source and licence is in dependencies.md. For security:
From Ubuntu 26.04 and ROS Lyrical (apt): Protobuf, OpenSSL 3.5, Embree, Assimp, tinyxml2, jsoncons, GDAL, PROJ, SDL3, Vulkan, NanoVDB/OpenVDB headers, MuJoCo (the ROS vendor package), SDFormat, rclcpp and the message packages. They get security fixes through the distribution’s updates; keep the machine updated.
Vendored at a pinned version (
vendor/): OpenUSD v26.08, Jolt v5.6.0, FMI Library 3.0.4, Dear ImGui and ImPlot. They do not update with the system: a fix needs a new pin and a Lagrange release.TODO(verify): an advisory scan of these four (OSV or the projects’ security pages) before each release; none was run for v1.0.0 (no scanner on this machine).Python (pip,
packaging/pip-constraints.txt): mcap and coacd, pinned by the constraints file.Licences: Apache-2.0 compatible throughout (
dependencies.md); no GPL in linked code.
5. Open items¶
An advisory scan of the vendored packages, and long fuzzing campaigns (§3, §4).
Signed packages: Sigstore signatures for the release artefacts are the owner’s to make (
cosign, with the owner’s identity); the.debs, container image and wheel are built and checked locally (roadmap §9).SROS2 for the ROS 2 bridge is documented, not tested.